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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
ROBERT CRAIG THOMAS 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20050013-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Defendant appeals his sentence from two consolidated judgments of conviction: 
(1) Possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), and attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101, 76-6-501 (West 2004); and (2) theft by 
deception, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 
2004), and attempted unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101, 76-6-506.1 (West 2004). See R6470:2-6; 
R5292:3-6.] 
Sentencing was consolidated for district court case numbers 041906470 and 
041905292. This Court consolidated the cases under a single case number on appeal, 
20050013-CA. See Order of Consolidation, 3 May 2005. For purposes of clarity, citation 
to the pleadings and transcript in original case number 041906470 will begin with the 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant affirmatively waive any objection to the trial court's denial 
of probation when he told the court that he wanted to go to prison rather than 
submit to a 90-day diagnostic evaluation? 
No standard of review applies. Because defendant led the trial court into any 
possible error in denying probation, review is foreclosed even for plain error. See State v. 
Finder, 2005 UT 15, ffi[ 62-63, 114 P.3d 551, 564 (declining review of claimed 
instructional error where defendant "signaled] by an affirmative act that he had no 
objection" to the instruction below); State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111, 
123 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented . . . that 
he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate court] will not review the 
instruction" even under plain error exception). 
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in imposing consecutive 
terms where the record reflects that the trial court considered all required statutory 
factors? 
No standard of review applies. Defendant made no timely objection to the trial 
court's sentence or imposition of consecutive terms. Because defendant has not argued 
designation "R6470," while citation in original case number 041905292 will begin with 
the designation "R5292." 
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plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim may not now be reviewed. See 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review claim of 
unpreserved error absent request for plain error review). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are cited in the body of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As noted above, defendant appeals his sentence from two consolidated judgments 
of conviction. 
Facts relevant to Meier & Frank incident.2 On July 26, 2004, defendant and his 
girlfriend used a stolen credit card to purchase $289.29 in merchandise from Meier & 
Frank in West Valley City. Supp. at 2. They had previously tried to use the card to 
purchase an additional $324.02 in merchandise. Id. West Valley police arrested the 
couple as they left the store. Id. After questioning defendant, police found the stolen 
credit card and wallet in a trash can near the mall food court. Supp. at 3. Inside the 
wallet was another credit card receipt from Circuit City for $1142.00. Id. When police 
searched defendant's car, they found all the merchandise bought with the stolen credit 
2Because defendant pleaded guilty in both cases, the facts are taken primarily from 
the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), see R5292:74 (manilla envelope), and PSI 
Addendum, see Supplemental Record (manilla envelope). Because the Supplemental 
Record contains complete copies of both the PSI and the PSI Addendum, the State's brief 
will cite to the Supplemental Record, e.g., Supp. at . 
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card except for a television set. Id. Police also discovered drug paraphernalia, an 
additional stolen credit card, and a stolen checkbook. Id. The state did not bring formal 
charges against defendant for these crimes until 6 October 2004. R6470:2. 
Facts relevant to 7-11 incident. On 11 August 2004, approximately two weeks 
after the Meier & Frank incident, on 11 August 2004, defendant tried to pass a stolen 
check for $30.63 at a 7-11 store. Supp. at 7. When confronted by a store employee, 
defendant tried to flee, but was apprehended by a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper who had 
just entered the store. Id. The trooper searched defendant's bag and found a glass drug 
pipe and two baggies containing methamphetamine. Id. Defendant was charged by 
information for this incident on 17 August 2004. R5292:3. 
Defendant claimed that he was given the stolen checks and credit cards by a 
"friend of a friend" who said it was "okay to use them." Supp. at 3, 7. 
Charges and plea agreements. As a result of the Meier & Frank incident, 
defendant was charged with unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506.2(1) (West 2004); theft by deception, 
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 2004); 
possession of a forged writing, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-6-502 (West 2004); unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506.2(1) (West 2004); theft by 
deception, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 
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2004), and two counts of theft by receiving stolen property, both class B misdemeanors, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (West 2004). R6470:2-4. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, on 26 October 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to one 
count of theft by deception, a third degree felony and an amended charge of attempted 
unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a class A misdemeanor. The remaining 
charges were dismissed. R6470:26, 28-41. 
As a result of the 7-11 incident, defendant was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (West 2004); possession of a forged writing, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-502 (West 2004); possession of 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West 
2004), and attempted theft by deception, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 2004). R5292:3-4. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, on 21 September 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony and an amended charge of 
attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor. The remaining charges were dismissed. 
R5292:24-32. 
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Consolidated sentencing hearing. A consolidated sentencing hearing was held 
on 3 December 2004. R6470:63.3 The trial court had before it the PSI prepared for the 7-
11 incident, and a PSI Addendum prepared for the Meier & Frank incident. See 
R6470:63 at 1, 3. The PSI and Addendum recommended incarceration, based on 
defendant's extensive history of drug addiction and incarceration, including the fact that 
he had already completed three different substance abuse treatment programs: 
[Defendant] has been committed to prison in three different jurisdictions 
those being Utah, Oklahoma and in the Federal Prison System. He was 
likewise placed on probation in multiple jurisdictions. Within three months 
of his last release from prison he resumed his criminal activity by 
committing the present offenses. He completed three different substance 
abuse programs (including CATS in 2001), and yet he did not cease his 
drug use or criminal activity. There are numerous substance abuse 
treatment programs available at the Utah State Prison if the defendant 
chooses to take advantage of them. 
Supp. at 6; see also Supp. at 2, 5. The PSI Addendum notes: 
[Defendant] claims to be and likely is, judging by his history, a drug addict. 
However, he is also a criminal preying on others to support his addiction as 
well as meet his needs. He continues to hang on to his criminal value 
system. He will give no information as to how he came by the wallet, the 
check book, the other credit card or to whom he gave the television while 
all the while maintaining he is through with crime and drugs. [Defendant] 
has a long history of incarcerations, both State and Federal with little 
observable change. He was committing new crimes within three months of 
release from prison in May [2004] and it is highly unlikely [defendant] 
would commit to an inpatient program. To complicate matters he is intent 
on continuing his relationship with his girlfriend/co-defendant. It is 
3A transcript of the consolidated sentencing hearing is found at both R6470:63 and 
R5292:73. 
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unlikely incarceration in this matter will induce any changes in the 
defendant but it will protect the community for a while. 
Supp. at 2. 
Before proceeding with the consolidated sentencing hearing, the trial court asked if 
there were any "inaccuracies or omissions that have not been previously pointed out" that 
either party wanted to "call to [her] attention?" R6470:63 at 1. Defense counsel asked the 
trial court to clarify a typo that erroneously suggested defendant owed restitution. Id. at 2. 
The trial court agreed with defense counsel's reading of the PSI. Id. Thereafter, defense 
counsel argued that she disagreed with Adult Probation and Parole's (AP&P) 
recommendation of incarceration. Id. at 3. According to defense counsel, in-patient 
treatment at Odyssey House was "the only hope for [defendant]." Id. at 2. Defense 
counsel argued that defendant admitted being an addict, that he believed the prior drug 
abuse programs he had completed were "not enough, and that he want[ed] to do an 
intensive inpatient program." Id. at 3. 
The trial court asked if a "diagnostic" had been completed for defendant. Id. 
When defense counsel indicated that it had not, the trial court stated that a "diagnostic 
evaluation" would be helpful. Id. Defendant interjected that he had had a diagnostic 
evaluation in Idaho. Id. When defense counsel clarified that it was "[a] long time ago," 
the trial court explained that she "may find to order a diagnostic, given the intensity of the 
statement of AP&P's recommendation[.]" R6470:63 at 4. 
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The trial court then heard from two of defendant's victims, both of whom asked 
that defendant "be given a sentence that will make him review his actions and realize 
what he does to others, and find respect for the judicial system." R6470:63 at 5; see also 
id. at 7 (agreeing with the prior victim and stating: "I think that if there are choices, that 
[defendant] should receive something on the severe side"). 
Following the victims' comments, the trial court stated that she was ordering a 
diagnostic evaluation and that defendant's sentence would include "significant" 
incarceration: 
I'll be frank with you, counsel, and indicate to you that I'm doing the 
diagnostic evaluation because I believe in looking at all alternatives, but 
frankly at this point I'm inclined to send him to prison. But we will see 
how he performs in the diagnostic unit, and whatever the penalty is going to 
be it's going to involve a significant amount of time behind bars. 
You need to be prepared for that. It's not going to be a month or 
two. And so I'd put your best foot forward, sir, at the diagnostic center, and 
if you do treat this as a joke, or flippantly, as the individual has indicated, 
when you're in for evaluation, the consequences will be real and significant. 
R6470:63 at 7-8. When the trial court thereafter ordered a 90-day diagnostic evaluation, 
defendant interjected: "Just send me to prison, then." R4670:63 at 8. The following 
dialogue ensued: 
THE COURT: You'd just like to go to prison? 
DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison. I ain't doing no 
evaluation. I ain't wasting ninety days. 
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THE COURT: 
DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: 
DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: 
DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: 
You don't waste it. You get credit for 
time served. You don't think you can do 
a diagnostic evaluation? 
I can do a diagnostic. 
So why don't you want to do it? 
Because they're going to recommend 
prison automatic. Every—your Honor, 
every time I've been in front of anybody, 
I went straight to prison. They send me 
to prison. I don't get no chance in there. 
I'm a drug addict. I'm sorry for what I 
did to them people. You think I like 
doing what I do? No, I don't like doing 
it. I want to go to Odyssey House where 
I can get some help. Diagnostic—I'm 
going to go to diagnostic. No matter 
what I say, no matter what I do in 
diagnostic, they're going to send me to 
prison. They're going to send me to 
prison. The board's going to look at that 
ninety days, and they're going to go, "So 
what?" 
First of all, they don't make the decision; 
I make the decision. But your attitude 
leaves a lot to be desired. Do you want 
to go directly to prison? 
I want to go to Odyssey House where I 
can get some help is where I want to go, 
your Honor. 
That's why I'm doing the diagnostic 
evaluation. Do you understand that? 
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DEFENDANT: No, I don't. I really don't. All I know is 
every time I get around them, they send 
me to prison. 
R6470:63 at 8-9. The trial court inquired if defense counsel wanted to confer with 
defendant, "or should I just send him to prison?" R4670:63 at 9. Defense counsel said 
she would confer with defendant in the holding cell and the trial court proceeded to 
consider other matters. Id. 
When the sentencing hearing resumed, the trial court confirmed that defendant had 
pleaded guilty to two third degree felonies. R4670:63 at 9-10. The trial court then 
informed defendant that his "attitude" had had "an impact on [her]." Id. at 10. 
Accordingly, the trial court determined "to do what [defendant] asked and . . . that is 
sentence you to prison." Id. Defendant responded: "Okay, your Honor. Thank you." Id. 
The trial court then imposed consecutive terms of zero-to-five years for the two third 
degree felonies, and consecutive jail terms of twelve months each for the two class A 
misdemeanors. R6470:43-44; R5292:45-46.4 At defense counsel's request the trial court 
clarified that defendant was entitled to credit for time served. R6470:63 at 10. When 
defendant asked if the trial court had said "consecutive," the trial court responded 
affirmatively: "I said consecutive. Your attitude has made a big difference in what I 
4The Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was signed on 3 December 2004. See 
R6470:43-44 andR5292:45-46. 
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intended to do." Id. Neither defense counsel nor defendant further commented on the 
sentence. Id. 
Motion for relief from judgment denied. On or about 16 December 2004, 
defendant filed a motion for "relief from judgment," requesting that his prison terms be 
made concurrent. See R6470:45-46 (the motion is stamped 22 December 2004). 
Defendant's motion was accompanied by a proposed Order to that effect. See R5292:59. 
After amending the proposed Order by interlineation to read, "denied—sentence is 
consecutive," the trial court signed it on 21 December 2004. Id. 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 30 
December 2004. R6470:51-52; R5292:61. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant led the trial court into any possible error in denying probation 
and imposing incarceration. Specifically, defendant refused to undergo a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation, a prerequisite to the trial court's willingness to consider probation, 
and repeatedly stated that he would rather go to prison. Because the trial court ultimately 
did as defendant requested and, given defendant's refusal to undergo evaluation, any error 
was invited and may not now be reviewed, even for plain error. 
In any event, defendant has not and cannot show any abuse of the trial court's 
considerable sentencing discretion. The trial court sentenced defendant within the 
statutory terms for the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Moreover, the trial court 
11 
knew from the PSI and the PSI Addendum that defendant was not a likely candidate for 
rehabilitation and had already received the benefit of three drug abuse treatment 
programs. The trial court also witnessed defendant's negative attitude first hand, during 
their exchange at the sentencing hearing. Thus, given the strength of AP&P's 
recommendation that defendant not be granted probation and defendant's refusal to 
submit to a diagnostic evaluation, the trial court properly determined that incarceration 
was justified. Because the trial court was in the most advantaged position to make this 
highly individualistic assessment, this Court should defer to the trial court's decision. 
Point II. Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the trial court's imposition 
of consecutive terms. Defendant's only arguable objection to the consecutive terms was 
filed thirteen days after the judgment was signed. Even then, defendant merely requested 
concurrent terms and wholly failed to identify the legal and factual assertions he raises for 
the first time on appeal. As defendant does not allege plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel, his challenge to the consecutive sentences may not now be reviewed. 
Even assuming that defendant preserved his challenge, it lacks merit. Defendant 
claims that the trial court erroneously focused on his "poor attitude" and thus failed to 
consider, as required by statute, his rehabilitative needs. Contrary to defendant's claim on 
appeal, the record reflects that the trial court was well acquainted with information in the 
PSI and PSI Addendum regarding defendant's history, character, and dim prospects for 
rehabilitation, well before defendant obstinately refused to submit to a diagnostic 
12 
evaluation. Moreover, there is no requirement that the sentencing court make express 
findings regarding each of the relevant statutory factors, nor is there any requirement that 
each factor be given equal weight. Because the court had before it information detailing 
all legally relevant factors, the only supportable conclusion is that it appropriately 
considered all of the evidence before sentencing defendant to consecutive terms. Thus, it 
cannot be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court 
here. Defendant, therefore, has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in 
imposing consecutive terms. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS CHALLENGE TO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PROBATION WHEN HE TOLD 
THE COURT THAT HE WANTED TO GO TO PRISON RATHER 
THAN SUBMIT TO A 90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION 
In Point A of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying him probation. Aplt. Br. at 13 ("The sentencing judge abused her discretion in 
imposing the maximum possible terms"). Specifically, defendant contends that the trial 
court misperceived his "attitude" at the sentencing hearing, and that this misperception 
"formed the entire basis for [the trial court's] decision." Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant 
affirmatively waived this claim. 
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A. Defendant led the trial court into any possible error. 
First, defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him 
to prison instead of probation is foreclosed by the invited error or affirmative waiver 
doctrine.5 As set forth in the statement of the case, supra, defendant repeatedly stated at 
sentencing that he would rather go to prison than submit to a diagnostic evaluation. See 
R4670:63 at 8-9. Indeed, defendant effectively presented the trial court with two 
sentencing options to which he was amenable: probation without a diagnostic evaluation 
or prison. Id. Because the trial court refused to grant probation without the benefit of a 
diagnostic evaluation, the court granted defendant's alternative desire—prison. R4670:63 
at 10. Indeed, defendant responded without objection: "Okay, your Honor. Thank you" 
Id 
Given that the trial court did as defendant asked, any possible error here in denying 
probation and sentencing defendant to prison was invited and may not now be reviewed 
even for plain error. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^ flj 62-63, 115 P.3d 551, 564 (declining 
to review claim of instructional error where defendant "signaled] by an affirmative act 
that he had no objection" to the instruction below). See also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22, Tf 54, 70 P.3d 111, 123 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the 
defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms is set 
forth in Point II, infra. 
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appellate court] will not review the instruction" even under plain error exception); State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (declining to reach plain error claim—where 
non-objection was conscious strategy—because it would "be sanctioning a procedure that 
fosters invited error"). 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
probation and imposing a prison sentence. 
Even if defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of prison over 
probation were not precluded, he fails to show any abuse of the trial court's vast 
sentencing discretion. "The decision whether to grant probation is within the complete 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1957)). Indeed, "[t]he only legal 
restriction is that the trial court not exceed the bounds of discretion." Id. A trial court has 
"broad discretion in imposing sentence within the statutory scope provided by the 
legislature." Id. at 1051. Moreover, a trial court has no obligation to favor rehabilitation 
over punishment. Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393 ("Probation is not a matter of right, and this is 
so no matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may be able to 
demonstrate to the trial judge"). Rather, "the [trial] court is empowered to place the 
defendant on probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is 
compatible with the public interest." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 (citation omitted). 
Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to statutory terms for the third degree 
felonies and class A misdemeanors to which he pleaded guilty. R6470:28-40; R5292:24-
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31. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004) ("A person who has been 
convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: . . . In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (West 
2004) ("A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 
imprisonment as follows: (1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding one year"). Thus, defendant's sentence, on its face, does not constitute an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, the trial court knew from the PSI and PSI Addendum that defendant had 
an extensive and dismal drug history, having received the benefit of three prior drug 
abuse treatment programs during his years of incarceration. Supp. at 2, 6. In addition, the 
trial court observed first hand defendant's unwillingness to submit to a 90-day diagnostic 
evaluation. R6470:63 at 8. Given the strength of AP&P's incarceration recommendation 
and defendant's refusal to submit to a diagnostic evaluation, the trial court recognized 
that defendant was not a good candidate for rehabilitation. See, e.g., State v. Nuttall, 861 
P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court emphasized 
punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-
19 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally give considerable weight to 
circumstances of crime). Such a disposition is well within the discretion of a sentencing 
court and should therefore be affirmed. 
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This Court should defer to the trial court's judgment. The trial court was in the 
most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic assessment required to 
fashion a just and appropriate sentence. Contrary to defendant's assertion, sentencing 
"necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 
665, 671 (Utah 1997) (quotations and citation omitted)). Certainly, the trial court's 
assessment of defendant's character was based at least partially on its personal 
observation of defendant's body language, demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which 
are reflected in the cold record on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994). 
In this case, the trial court evaluated the evidence, exercised its discretion within 
the bounds of the law, and imposed proper statutory penalties for the offenses to which 
defendant pleaded guilty. Because it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court," the court did not abuse its discretion. Gerrard, 
584 P.2d at 887. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
TO MAKE DEFENDANT'S TERMS OF INCARCERATION 
CONSECUTIVE WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL THE REQUIRED 
STATUTORY FACTORS 
In Part B of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive terms. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. The trial court's imposition of consecutive terms 
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should be affirmed, first, because defendant failed to raise a timely or specific objection, 
and second, because defendant's claim of error lacks merit. 
A. Defendant failed to make a timely or specific objection to 
his consecutive sentences. 
This Court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Cruz, 2005 UT 45,133, P.3d ; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346; 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Here, defendant did not preserve a 
challenge to the legality of the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences and, 
therefore, appellate review is waived. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d All, All (Utah App. 
1987). 
As set forth in the Statement of the Case, supra, defendant did not request 
concurrent terms or argue against consecutive sentences at the consolidated sentencing 
hearing. See R6470:63 at 1-10. Moreover, when the trial court imposed consecutive 
terms, defendant merely inquired: "Did she say consecutive?" R6470:63 at 10. Neither 
defendant nor defense counsel objected to the trial court's pronouncement of consecutive 
sentences, let alone asserted that the trial court had failed to consider the statutory 
requirements, as defendant now claims on appeal. Id; see Aplt. Br. at 19-21 (alleging 
trial court failed to consider required factors set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) 
(West 2004)). And while defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment thirteen days 
after the trial court signed the minute entry imposing consecutive sentences, he merely 
requested concurrent terms. He did not suggest even at that time, that the trial court had 
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not considered the statutory requirements. See R6470:45-46. Thus, even assuming that 
defendant's post-judgment motion was appropriate and timely, he failed to identify the 
legal and factual assertions that he now raises in his appellate brief. Id. The trial court 
summarily denied the motion by interlineation, amending the proposed Order to read 
"denied—sentence is consecutive." R5292:59. 
This Court has previously suggested that prompt and specific preservation of any 
objection to consecutive sentences is required for appellate review. See State v. Perez, 
2002 UT App 211, f 46, 52 P.3d 451 (noting defendant's prompt objection and trial 
court's overruling thereof before proceeding to reach alleged error on appeal). That is 
consistent with Utah's contemporaneous preservation rule. See State v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982) ("This is clearly a case where a timely and specific objection 
would have afforded the trial court the opportunity to address McCardelPs concerns"). 
Utah courts require timely and specific objections "in order 'to bring all claimed errors to 
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if 
appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
See also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346 ('"[T]he trial court ought to be 
given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it'") (quoting 
State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)). 
"Accordingly, an objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that 
the trial [court] can consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 
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361) (internal quotations omitted in original)). Here, any arguable objection defendant 
made to the imposition of consecutive sentences was not only untimely, but also non-
specific. His belated request for concurrent terms was insufficient to alert the trial court 
to defendant's claim on appeal, that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative 
needs as required by statute. See id. at \ 34 (holding that Cruz's objection to jurors' 
conversation did not preserve his objection to alleged juror bias); State v. Eldredge, 111 
P.2d 29, 35 ("An objection based on competency does not call the trial court's attention to 
the reliability issue"); State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that 
defendant's discovery objection "certainly cannot be said to have alerted the trial court to 
the foundation problem" of the witness's testimony and thus the objection was 
unpreserved). Defendant thus failed to preserve below his challenge to the trial court's 
imposition of consecutive terms. As defendant does not allege plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel, his claim may not now be reviewed. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review claim of unpreserved error absent 
request for plain error review). 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
consecutive terms of incarceration. 
Even assuming that defendant's appellate challenge to the imposition of 
consecutive sentences were preserved, imposing consecutive terms is well within the 
discretion of a sentencing court. Section 76-3-401, governs the trial court's authority to 
impose consecutive sentences. This statute directs the court to "consider the gravity and 
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circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Section 76-3-401(2). A trial court may thus abuse 
its discretion if it imposes consecutive terms without considering all of the factors that are 
legally relevant to the sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. McCovey, 883 P.2d 
1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). 
The court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors, however, reflects the 
general principle that courts are accorded broad discretion in sentencing matters. As 
noted previously, it is the trial court, after all, that is in the most advantaged position to 
make the highly individualistic assessments required in sentencing decisions. Woodland, 
945 P.2d at 671. In deciding the appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court 
must consider many intangibles, like the defendant's "character, personality, and attitude, 
of which the cold record gives little inkling." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393; see also State v. 
McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). 
Here, defendant complains that because the trial court focused on his "attitude," it 
necessarily ignored the relevant statutory factors listed in section 76-3-401(2) in imposing 
consecutive sentences, specifically, his rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. 
The crux of defendant's argument is that the trial court misinterpreted his response to the 
court's request for a 90-day diagnostic evaluation. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. According to 
defendant, his reaction was neither obdurate nor a manifestation of his "poor attitude." 
Aplt. Br. at 15. Rather, defendant argues that the trial court should have perceived his 
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conduct as reflecting only "his desire for and commitment to treatment." Aplt. Br. at 16. 
However, "the fact that that [defendant] view[ed] his situation differently than did the 
trial court does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider the factors listed in 
section 76-3-401(4)." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14, 40 P.3d 626. 
Defendant's complaint is similar to the unsuccessful challenge to consecutive 
sentences raised in Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 10. Defendant, like Helms, "encourages this 
[Cjourt to assume that the trial court did not consider the factors at all, simply because it 
did not address each of the factors on the record." Id. Just as Helms did, however, 
defendant fails to show that the trial court did not consider "the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
[of defendant]." Section 76-3-401(2). 
As made plain in Helms, the sentencing court is not required to make a record of 
its consideration of each factor. 2002 UT 12, ^ f 11. Moreover, section 76-3-401(2), while 
directing consideration of all factors, does not require the court to accord each of the 
factors equal weight. See, e.g., Howell, 707 P.2d at 117-119 (recognizing that sentencing 
judges generally give considerable weight to circumstances of crime); State v. Carson, 
597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979) (judge has discretion in determining weight given to 
sentencing recommendations contained in evaluation reports). The instant record reflects 
that the trial court implicitly, if not expressly, considered each factor, especially 
defendant's poor prospects for rehabilitation. 
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Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's comments at the sentencing 
hearing demonstrate that she was well acquainted with his history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs. See Section 76-3-401(2). Indeed, the trial court noted that she was 
inclined to impose "significant" prison time before defendant ever expressed his disdain 
for diagnostic evaluations. R6470:63 at 7-8. Although defendant's chances for 
rehabilitation were slim, the trial court expressed willingness to consider probation, 
depending on the results of a 90-day diagnostic evaluation. Id The court's comments are 
presumably based on her familiarity with the PSI and PSI Addendum, which defendant 
wholly ignores. See, e.g., R6470:63 at 1-2, 4, 7-8. The PSI and PSI Addendum explore 
in great detail his responses to the current charges, including his failure to cooperate in 
the investigations, his lengthy and dismal drug history, and the unlikely probability that he 
would benefit from, or sufficiently commit to, yet another drug abuse treatment program. 
Supp. at 1-10. Added to this information was the trial court's own exchange with 
defendant wherein he made plain his contempt for, and refusal to undergo, a diagnostic 
evaluation. See R6470:63 at 8-9. Thus, the information before the trial court clearly and 
extensively documented defendant's history, his character, and his rehabilitative 
prospects, which appeared doubtful at best. Id. Consequently, the mere "brevity of the 
sentencing order does not make the order and the facts surrounding the order so 
ambiguous that it would be unreasonable for [the Court] to conclude that the trial court 
properly considered the factors in section 76-3-401(4)." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  12. 
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State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 52 P.3d 451, cited by defendant, is not to the 
contrary. This Court rejected the consecutive sentence imposed there because the record 
did not reflect that the trial court considered any other factor than the "gravity and 
circumstances" of the crimes at issue. Id. at f 48 (quoting section 76-3-401(4)). As 
demonstrated above, however, the trial court's comments here—particularly its desire for 
a 90-day diagnostic evaluation—reflect its familiarity with the information set forth in the 
PSI and PSI Addendum, which covered all the relevant statutory criteria. See Supp. 1-16. 
See also Section 76-3-401(2). 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant complains that the trial court did not 
comment on AP&P's recommendation for concurrent sentences. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. 
Defendant again suggests that the court's silence in this respect shows her failure to 
consider all legally relevant factors. Id. For all the reasons stated above, including the 
trial court's obvious familiarity with the PSI and PSI Addendum, defendant's claim fails 
to show that all legally relevant factors were not considered. The fact that the trial court 
did not reference the recommendation does not mean that the trial court did not read the 
rest of the report. Indeed, the trial court's familiarity with defendant's history belies that 
claim. Moreover, a trial court is not bound to follow the recommendations of either the 
prosecutor or AP&P. See State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1302 (Utah App. 1989) 
("[T]here is no reason to set aside a guilty plea if the court did not follow the prosecutor's 
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recommendations, even if the defendant is disappointed with the severity of the 
sentence"). 
Because the trial court had before it, and was familiar with, information detailing 
all legally relevant factors, the only supportable legal conclusion is that it appropriately 
considered all of the evidence before sentencing defendant to consecutive indeterminate 
prison terms. In other words, where the record shows that the trial court had before it 
information regarding all the statutory factors, a reviewing court assumes that the trial 
court considered them. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651-652 (Utah App. 1997) 
(sentencing court properly considered statutory factors where relevant evidence was 
presented through record evidence, including PSI). That well-settled rule is consistent 
with the broad discretion accorded sentencing decisions. In sum, under the undisputed 
factual circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The trial court, thus, 
did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive prison terms and defendant's 
sentence should therefore be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's consecutive terms of 
incarceration. 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2004; 9:46 A.M. 
2 HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Yes. 
5 MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, could we please take 
6 number 30 and 31? These are Robert Craig Thomas. 
7 THE COURT: You bet. We have sentencing on 
8 Mr. Thomas. Are we going to go forward with that today? 
9 MS. ROBERTS: We are. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Just a minute. I'm not seeing my 
11 presentence report. 
12 MS. ROBERTS: There was one, and then there was an 
13 addendum. I have an unmarked addendum if you need one, your 
14 Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Hang on just one minute. I'm sure I've 
16 got it. I do. 
17 Okay. This is the time set for sentencing. Is there 
18 any legal reason known to you why we should not proceed with 
19 sentencing at this juncture? 
2 0 MS. ROBERTS: None, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Are there any inaccuracies or omissions 
22 that have not been previously pointed out that you want to call 
23 to my attention? 
24 MS. ROBERTS: Oh, there's only one. On page 5, there 
25 is a mention of the - and that is on the original presentence 
1 report. I think there's a typo there that says that there 
2 was — it's unclear whether there is some restitution owed to 
3 Mr. Kroll. I'm sorry. It's page 9, the bottom, victim impact 
4 statement and restitution. It says: 
5 "The police report did not cite any 
6 contact information concerning anyone named 
7 Spencer Kroll since the defendant was 
8 apprehended, and the above check was not 
9 cashed." 
10 I think that AP&P meant to write, "It does not appear 
11 restitution is owed in this case." 
12 THE COURT: And that seems to me to be what it means. 
13 MS. ROBERTS: That's the only thing that I know of. 
14 THE COURT: All right. And you've had a chance to go 
15 through the report with the defendant? 
16 MS. ROBERTS: I have, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: I'm happy to hear (inaudible). 
18 MS. ROBERTS: Okay. Your Honor, I think the bottom 
19 line in this case is really that Odyssey House is the only hope 
20 for Mr. Thomas. We did have an agreement with the D.A. that 
21 they would recoinmend that he be able to enter an inpatient 
22 program if one was available. I've spoken to Mark Augustine 
23 yesterday, and there will be a bed December or January. That's 
24 as specific as he can be. 
25 I'd just like to point out a few things to the Court, 
1 if I could. 
2 THE COURT: All right. 
3 MS. ROBERTS: The first case that came before me for 
4 Mr. Thomas, he pled to that case at roll call. That was the 
5 case involving the incident August 11th, 2004. Then we found 
6 out he had another case with more charges; that's why you have 
7 the addendum here. 
8 He has, as long as I've know him, always taken full 
9 responsibility for these matters, and has also spoken to me 
10 that he is an addict, that he knows that, that he knows that — 
11 that he feels that the CATS program was not enough, and that he 
12 wants to do an intensive inpatient program. He didn't even ask 
13 for First Step. He said that it could be nothing less than 
14 Odyssey. 
15 I know that AP&P is very clear about their 
16 recommendation, because they feel that he will not — he's just 
17 not able to be rehabilitated, and we simply don't agree with 
18 that. First of all, he has succeeded on parole, contrary to 
19 what AP&P says. They noted on page 5 that between "9 6 and "99 
20 he successfully completed parole. 
21 THE COURT: We haven't done a diagnostic, have we? 
22 MS. ROBERTS: I don't think so. 
23 THE COURT: I think a diagnostic evaluation may be — 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Well, I did one in Idaho. 
25 MS. ROBERTS: In Idaho? A long time ago? 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. And I just got -
2 THE COURT: No. I mean recently in connection with my 
3 case. I may find to order a diagnostic given the intensity of 
4 the statement of AP&P's recommendation and the possibility 
5 XXXX. 
6 MS. ROBERTS: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: I'm going to order a sixty-day diagnostic 
8 evaluation. 
9 Mr. Parker? 
10 MR. PARKER: Your Honor, the Court should know that 
11 one of the victims is present in court today, as well as the 
12 spouse of one of the other victims. I believe at least one of 
13 them wanted to address the Court. 
14 THE COURT: All right. I'd like to hear from them. 
15 Do you mind standing over by the jury box with your 
16 client? 
17 MR. PARKER: Both of them would like to speak, your 
18 Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right. I'd like to hear from both of 
20 you. 
21 A WOMAN: Your Honor, I need to read this. 
22 THE COURT: That's fine. 
23 A WOMAN: Okay. I am a victim of Mr. Thomas's 
24 actions and dishonesty. That is the Mr. Thomas that takes the 
25 court and judge's orders and sentences very flippant. He uses 
1 the system. He is disrespectful of people and their property. 
2 I do believe that he premeditates his actions. His actions 
3 have cost not just a monetary amount, but the time and a great 
4 deal of anguish. 
5 It has caused me health problems, interrupted my 
6 life, and seems never to end, go away, or lessen. I'm paranoid 
7 and very nervous. He is a villain, and I think he just thinks 
8 this is all quite a joke. 
9 I request that Mr. Thomas be given a sentence that 
10 will make him review his actions and realize what he does to 
11 others, and find respect for the judicial system. And I hope 
12 that he can be enrolled in programs that can help him change 
13 his life around. Thank you, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. Very well put. 
15 Does someone else wish to speak? And your name, sir? 
16 MR. GERBER: My name is Kent Gerber. 
17 THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. GERBER: My wife is Danielle Gerber. 
19 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Gerber. 
20 MR. GERBER: And I wish my wife were here today. 
21 She's out of the country with my son on a trip that had been 
22 planned many months ago and wasn't able to postpone it or 
23 change it. 
24 The lady who just addressed the Court I'm sure 
25 represents a lot of the feelings of my wife. She felt 
1 violated. She — she had her wallet stolen; consequently, her 
2 identity. She lost cash. She lost wonderful sentimental 
3 photos that were in her wallet that she misses and are 
4 irreplaceable. 
5 She — we were notified the evening of the theft 
6 that — by our credit union that a large amount of charges were 
7 coming in on her credit card, and they wondered if she had made 
8 them, and so she went to check her purse, and the wallet was 
9 missing. Up until that time she didn't even know. 
10 Mr. Thomas obviously had been quickly going around 
11 the area charging gas and hundreds, many hundreds, of dollars 
12 worth of goods at various department stores. He was 
13 apprehended, as I understand it, at Meier & Frank. At any 
14 rate, my wife, being a rather sensitive person, a naturalized 
15 citizen of about forty years, she just didn't think this could 
16 happen in the United States of America. 
17 And she — she was disappointed, but traumatized. She 
18 knew that she didn't know who this man was. She — she — it 
19 would be helpful for her to be here today to see his face so 
20 that at least she would in the future, if she were around him, 
21 would know that he was the one who had done this to her. 
22 She — she feels insecure because she knows that he 
23 knows who she is and where she lives, and has various numbers 
24 that relate to her identity. She, of course, had to go through 
25 much effort to change cards, driver's licenses, Social 
1 Security, and it took her over a month and a half of continual 
2 stress with a particular company that had the largest amount of 
3 charges, even though they were the ones that notified the 
4 police, generally speaking. They were the most difficult 
5 because their head offices were out of town, and it's been very 
6 traumatic. 
7 And I just second what the — the lady said. I 
8 recognize he — he has problems, but he's caused a great deal of 
9 harm to other people, and I think that if there are choices, 
10 that he should receive something on the severe side. Thank 
11 you. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 Would the State like to be heard, Mr. Parker, today? 
14 MR. PARKER: No. We'll submit it, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Do you have any objection to a 
16 diagnostic — 
17 MR. PARKER: I do not. 
18 THE COURT: - evaluation at the Utah State Prison? 
19 MR. PARKER: I do not. 
20 THE COURT: I'll be frank with you, counsel, and 
21 indicate to you that I'm doing the diagnostic evaluation 
22 because I believe in looking at all alternatives, but frankly 
23 at this point I'm inclined to send him to prison. But we will 
24 see how he performs in the diagnostic unit, and whatever the 
25 I penalty is going to be it's going to involve a significant 
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1 amount of time behind bars. 
2 You need to be prepared for that. It's not going to 
3 be a month or two. And so I'd put your best foot forward, sir, 
4 at the diagnostic center, and if you do treat this as a joke, 
5 or flippantly, as the individual has indicated, when you're in 
6 for evaluation, the consequences will be real and significant. 
7 Do you understand me? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Forthwith - and we'll set 
10 this ninety days hence. I think I'm going to ask for a 
11 ninety-day diagnostic evaluation. 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison, then. 
13 THE COURT: You'd just like to go to prison? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison. I ain't 
15 doing no evaluation. I ain't wasting ninety days. 
16 THE COURT: You don't waste it. You get credit for 
17 time served. You don't think you can do a diagnostic 
18 evaluation? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: I can do a diagnostic. 
20 THE COURT: So why don't you want to do it? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Because they're going to recommend 
22 prison automatic. Every — your Honor, every time I've been in 
23 front of anybody, I went straight to prison. They send me to 
24 prison. I don't get no chance in there. 
25 I'm a drug addict. I'm sorry for what I did to them 
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1 people. You think I like doing what I do? No, I don't like 
2 doing it. I want to go to Odyssey House where I can get some 
3 help. Diagnostic — I'm going to go to diagnostic. No matter 
4 what I say, no matter what I do in diagnostic, they're going to 
5 send me to prison. They're going to send me to prison. The 
6 board's going to look at that ninety days, and they're going to 
7 go, "So what?" 
8 THE COURT: First of all, they don't make the 
9 decision; I make the decision. But your attitude leaves a lot 
10 to be desired. Do you want to go directly to prison? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: I want to go to Odyssey House where I 
12 can get some help is where I want to go, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: That's why I'm doing the diagnostic 
14 evaluation. Do you understand that? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't. I really don't. All I 
16 know is every time I get around them, they send me to prison. 
17 THE COURT: Will you confer with your client, or 
18 should I just send him to prison? 
19 MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, if I could take a minute 
20 with him in the holding cell. 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 MS. ROBERTS: Thank you. 
23 (The Court gave attention to other 
24 matters on the call.) 
25 THE COURT: We have a theft by receiving, a third, 
1 and a forgery, a third. Is that correct, counsel? 
2 MS. ROBERTS: I believe so. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, your attitude has had an 
4 impact on me. I'm inclined to do what you've asked and to do 
5 it, and that is sentence you to prison. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Okay, your Honor. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: It will be the order of the Court that 
8 Mr. Thomas is sentenced to prison on the third-degree felony to 
9 the indeterminate term of zero to five years. On the forgery, 
10 it's to run consecutive, and it's also a zero-to-five 
11 commitment, forthwith. 
12 Is he entitled to any credit for time served? 
13 MS. ROBERTS: He is, your Honor. He's been in since 
14 August, I believe August 11th. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Did she say consecutive? 
16 THE COURT: I said consecutive. Your attitude has 
17 made a big difference in what I intended to do. 
18 Could you calculate the exact time, counsel, and he's 
19 entitled to credit for time served. 
2 0 MS. ROBERTS: We'll do that, 
21 I (Proceedings concluded at 10:06 a.m.) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
10 
CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned proceedings held before Judge Leslie 
Lewis was transcribed by me from a video recording and 
is a full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 28th day of February, 2005 in Sandy, 
Utah. 
JIKUJ&£^~-
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2006 
N0TARY PUBLIC 
/ » - " - . ^ ^ CAROLYN E^.CKSON 
/ V > * P V , \ 17/5 CLLhN WAY 
' " , > ^ { F \ \ SANDY UTB4092 
{
 r \ ft / ) 111 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
\ / " ^ / V MAY 1 2005 
'%. "T*<y STATE OF U I AH 
